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Abstract
This article investigates the co-evolution of labor relationships and work-
ers preferences. According to recent experimental economics findings on so-
cial preferences, the workforce is assumed to be heterogeneous. It is com-
posed by both cooperative and non-cooperative workers. In addition, firms
differ by the type of contract they offer (explicit or implicit). Finally, both
the distribution of preferences and the degree of contractual completeness
are endogeneized. Preferences evolve through a process of cultural transmis-
sion and the proportion of implicit contracts is driven by an evolutionary
process. The complementarity between the transmission of cooperation and
the implementation of implicit contracts leads to multiple equilibria which
allow for path-dependence. This property is illustrated by the evolutions of
American and Japanese labor contracts during the twentieth century.
Résumé
Cet article propose une explication conjointe de la nature des relations
de travail et du degrè de coopération des travailleurs. La force de travail est
composée de deux types de travailleurs (cooperatifs et non coopératifs). Les
firmes se distinguent par la nature du contrat qu’elles offrent (explicite ou
implicite). La distribution des préférences ainsi que la proportion de chaque
type de contrat sont endogéneisées. Les préférences sont transmises entre
les générations à travers un processus de transmission culturelle. La pro-
portion de contrats implicites évolue à travers un processus évolutionnaire.
La complémentarité entre la transmission du comportement coopératif et
l’instauration d’un contrat implicite induit l’existence d’équilibres multiples
et la propriété de dépendance à l’histoire. Celle-ci est illustrée par la com-
paraison des évolutions du contrat de travail au Japon et aux USA.
JEL Codes: D64, D86, Z10.
Keywords: explicit contract, implicit contract, cultural transmission,
preferences for reciprocity, path dependence.
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1 Introduction
The international comparisons of employment relationships and contractual
practices in large manufacturing firms mainly focus on two major and antag-
onistic models. On the one hand, the American one, which is based on ex-
plicit and legally enforceable agreements between employees and employers.
On the other hand, the Japanese one where implicit and ambiguous employ-
ment contracts dominate.1 This co-existence of different types of contract
deviates from the traditional economic explanations. Indeed, the standard
principal-agent theory predicts that an explicit contract provides more incen-
tives to workers than an implicit contract . Consequently, this latter should
have vanished over time.
However, recent findings in experimental economics mitigate this pre-
diction. They justify the implementation of implicit contract through the
presence of subjects who exhibit social preferences .2 Fehr and co-authors
show that a positive fraction of subjects behaves reciprocally and provides a
positive effort even if an implicit contract is proposed (see Fehr & Gätcher
(2000) for a survey).3 Then, implicit contracts seem to provide intrinsic work
motivation to agents who exhibit preferences for reciprocity . Moreover, Fehr
& Gätcher (2000) and Frey (1997) show that extrinsic motivation (as supervi-
sion or monetary rewards) crowd out these intrinsic motivations. As a result,
if the proportion of reciprocator workers (workers who exhibit preferences for
reciprocity) is large enough, the implementation of implicit contracts induces
more incentives than explicit contract . Then, it could be the optimal choice
of a firm. Finally, differences in the distribution of preferences could be at
the origin of disparities in employment relationships.
This recent literature reintroduces older views on the distinction between
American and Japanese style of management. According to these perspec-
tives, the origin of this discrepancy comes from cultural differences between
the two societies (see Morigushi (2000) for further discussions). The more
cooperative nature of the Japanese workforce would explain the adoption
of the implicit contract . However, taking the culture (in our framework,
1Morigushi ((2000), (2003)) highlights the non-enforceable nature of the corporate wel-
fare programs, broadly implemented by Japanese firms.
2Alternative explanations exist but social preferences seem to provide a more relevant
explanation (see Bowles (2000)).
3These experimental results are obtained even in one-shot interaction. In this frame-
work, the possibility of subsequent gains do not constitute motivations for cooperation.
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the distribution of preferences) as given, exogenous and invariant over time,
it fails to explain the evolution of labor relationships within the two coun-
tries. Morigushi ((2000), (2003)) highlights that evolutions of American and
Japanese labor relationships, during the twentieth century, were accurately
similar until 1930’s. They are characterized by the transition from an explicit
contract to a more implicit contract .4 The Great Depression appears to con-
stitute a change in the trajectory associated with the return of the explicit
contract in the large American manufactures. According to these facts, the
American workers were sufficiently cooperative at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century to allow for the adoption of the implicit contracts. However,
economic shocks, as the Great Depression, seem to be able to break out the
cooperation. To comply with these facts, the culture has to be considered as
an endogenous variable.
The literature on the cultural transmission of preferences, originated by
works of Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) and Boyd & Richerson (1985), pro-
vides the tools to endogenize the distribution of preference for reciprocity .
It highlights the role of the vertical transmission of preferences, that is the
transmission from parents to children. Following Bisin & Verdier (2001), we
consider this vertical transmission as endogenous. In this framework, Bisin
et al. (2004) and Olcina & Peñarrubia (2004) analyze the evolution of coop-
eration. Our work is more closely related to this later article which assumes
that a population of agents, heterogeneous according to their preferences for
reciprocity, is randomly matched with an homogeneous population of princi-
pals to play a coordination game. We depart from this framework, assuming
that both the population of workers and the population of firms is hetero-
geneous, which allow us to obtain a co-evolution between the distribution of
preferences and the nature of the labor relationhips.
In the present model, both workers and firms are heterogeneous. At each
date, a worker is randomly matched with a firm. A firm is characterized
through the proposed contract, either implicit or explicit . An explicit con-
tract precisely defines the level of effort required from the worker and the
level of reward associated with this effort. A worker providing an effort lower
than the level required is detected with a positive probability and dismissed.
This threat provides extrinsic motivations to workers. Conversely, an implicit
contract consists in the promise of a reward in exchange of the worker’s effort.
4These transition towards the implicit contracting manifested by the spread of corporate
welfare in both countries (Morigushi ((2000), (2003))).
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This contract is not enforceable as both firm and worker have the possibil-
ity to break the commitment. However, it provides intrinsic motivation for
workers having preferences for reciprocity. Moreover, the joint cooperation
of the worker and the firm allows for an additional profit.
In the model, there exist two types of workers within the population,
cooperative and non-cooperative. Cooperative workers exhibit a preference for
the reciprocity while the decisions of non-cooperative workers are only ruled
by the material payoffs. It is shown that non-cooperative workers have higher
effort incentives if the contract is explicit than when the contract is implicit .
Conversely, cooperative workers have higher effort incentives if the contract
is implicit but only if the firm respects its commitment. Consequently, the
relative expected profit of a firm which offers the implicit contracts (with
respect to the firm offering the explicit contract) increases with the proportion
of cooperative workers.
The changes in the proportion of implicit contracts are driven by an
evolutionary process. As a result, this proportion is increasing if the pro-
portion of cooperative workers is large enough (decreasing if this proportion
is low). Preferences of workers are assumed to be transmitted from par-
ents to children, through a mechanism of transmission in line with Bisin &
Verdier (2001). We assume that parents make an explicit and costly effort
of socialization which determines the probability of transmitting their pref-
erences to their children. Parents being altruistic, this effort will depend on
the expected utility associated with each type of preferences. Therefore, the
more important is the proportion of implicit contract , the greater are the
incentives of a cooperative parent to transmit his own preference.
The joint dynamics of the distribution of contracts and the evolution
of preferences potentially induces multiple equilibria. This property implies
that two countries having close initial conditions can follow distinct trajec-
tories and converge to different long-run situations. Two long-run equilibria
are potentially stable, the IC-equilibrium (where all firms adopt the implicit
contract and the proportion of cooperative workers is high) and the EC-
equilibrium (where explicit contract dominates and cooperative workers are
fewer).
In this framework, we assess the possibility of path dependence since
exogenous shocks have a lasting impact on the evolution of the contract.
As an illustration, consider an economy which converges towards the IC-
equilibrium. During the convergence, both the proportion of implicit con-
tracts and the proportion of cooperative workers increase. Consider now an
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exogenous shock in favor of the explicit contract . The model predicts that
the effects of this shock depend on the structure of preferences in the econ-
omy where it occurs. Indeed, the explicit contract provide more incentives
to non-cooperative workers. Thus, the gain of adopting this contract is posi-
tively related to the proportion of non-cooperative workers. Along the path
of convergence towards the IC-equilibrium, an early shock occurs when the
proportion of non-cooperative workers is still sufficiently important. Then, it
enhances the probability of bifurcation towards the EC-equilibrium.
This property of path dependence can help us to understand why U.S.
and Japan, originally on the same path (characterized by the decrease of
the level of contractual completeness), experienced different evolutions since
1930’s. Indeed, the periods of economic recessions can be interpreted as
exogenous shocks in support of the explicit contract . The Great Depression
deeply affected the U.S. economy at a moment where the implementation of
the implicit contracting was limited and consequently the level of cooperation
of the workforce still low. Then, it could explain why the implicit contract has
been phased out. A comparable shock occurred in Japan almost two decades
later (the Japanese post-war depression). At this time, the implicit contract
was a generalized practice and the level of cooperation was sufficiently high
to avoid the spread of the explicit contracts. Hence, differences in the timing
of the shocks may have induced long-term divergences in the type of labor
relationships and the distribution of preferences between the two countries.
These findings are in line with Morigushi ((2000), (2003), (2005)). How-
ever, our theoretical framework differs broadly from Morigushi’s one. She
considers an employment system as an equilibrium outcome of a repeated
game between workers and firms. This game presents multiple equilibria
and the selection of equilibrium depends on the institutional capital (level
of trust) accumulated by the economy. Hence, culture is assimilated to this
institutional capital and to beliefs on the behaviors of other players. In our
framework, the culture is a distribution of preferences, which evolves over
time. Taking into account heterogenous preferences allows to obtain the re-
sults of Morigushi without considering repeated interactions between firms
and workers. However, the proportion of cooperative workers in the present
model could be interpreted as institutional capital in the Morigushi’s studies.
Greater is this proportion, higher is the probability to sustain cooperation
between employers and workers.
The next section introduces the two worker types, cooperative and non-
cooperative and the two contract types, implicit and explicit . It also sets out
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the main assumptions of the model. In section 3, the short-run equilibrium
is analyzed. Section 4 endogenizes the distribution of preferences and the
distribution of labor contracts. Section 5 presents the long-run dynamics.
Section 6 offers observations on the prediction of the model. Finally, section
7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Basic structure
The economy is constituted of a continuum of firms and a continuum of
workers. Both the population of firms and the population of workers are
heterogeneous. Two types of firm co-exist, the type IC offers an implicit
contract and the type EC offers an explicit contract . The proportion of IC
firms is denoted by pt, thus (1 − pt) denotes the proportion of EC firms.
The population of workers is constituted by a proportion qt of cooperative
(or reciprocator) workers and a proportion (1 − qt) of non-cooperative (or
selfish) workers. Workers live one period. At the begining of their life they
acquire their preferences, then they work and make effort to transmit their
preferences to their children.5
At each date t , a firm is randomly matched with a worker, produces and
makes an expected profit Πςt(qt) function of qt, where ς ∈ {IC,EC} denotes
the type of the firm. It is assumed that the firm cannot observe the type of
the worker but knows the distribution of preferences (i.e. qt). To simplify,
we consider the labor as the unique input. The change in pt is driven by
an evolutionary process and the change in qt by a mechanism of cultural
transmission.
2.2 Nature of the contract
An implicit contract is specific as it is not legally enforceable. It consists
in an exchange of commitments between the employer and the employee.
The employee commits to provide effort and cooperation and the employer
commits to provide non-contractable benefits to him. Since the contract is
5To simplify a non-overlapping structure has been chosen. This assumption does not
influence the results of the model.
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not enforceable, the commitment can be unilaterally broken up without costs
and with legal impunity.
Conversely, the explicit contract specifies precisely the worker’s tasks and
earnings. It allows for the supervision of employees. If a worker does not
accomplish these specific tasks and is detected, he is dismissed. This threat
of dismissal provides extrinsic motivations to effort for workers.
2.3 Cooperative and non-cooperative types
A cooperative worker (indexed by c) exhibits preferences for reciprocity. The
trust granted by the principal (the firm) represents an incentive for cooper-
ative agents to provide an effort. In this case, a well specified contract that
enables a low degree of freedom (explicit contract) is considered as a sign
of distrust and implies a loss of utility (Frey (1997)). Moreover, a coopera-
tive worker suffers a loss whenever either himself or the company chooses to
cooperate while the other does not.6
A non-cooperative worker (indexed by nc) is assumed to be self-regarding.
His decisions are independent from the potential intrinsic motivations pro-
vided by a contract and are only ruled by extrinsic motivations.
3 Short-run equilibrium
At each date t, a worker is randomly matched with a firm and knows the
contract proposed by it.7 Whatever the type of contract, the worker has to
choose his level of effort. To simplify, we assume that the choice set is discrete
(ec ∈ {e¯, e} denotes the effort choice of a cooperative worker and enc ∈ {e¯, e}
the effort choice of a non-cooperative worker). Inside the firm a worker has
to choose between working and shirking. Non-cooperative workers suffer a
disutility of effort d when they choose e¯. A subjective cost (or gain) is added
to this disutility for the cooperative workers. The value of this cost/gain
depends on the nature of the contract and the behavior of the principal.
6It is a standard assumption to represent the preference for reciprocity. See, for instance
Guttman (2003).
7It is assumed that accepting the contract is always profitable for the worker. Workers
choice of participation is beyond the scope of this article.
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3.1 Explicit contract
An explicit contract specifies a wage w and a limited set of tasks implying
the choice of e¯. Moreover, the specification of the tasks allows the firm to
check out workers effort with a positive probability s. A detected shirker
is dismissed and not paid. As mentionned previously, notice that coopera-
tive workers consider the implementation of an explicit contract as a sign
of distrust. This feeling induces a subjective cost modeled as an additional
disutility of effort. D > d denotes the total disutility of effort (objective and
subjective) for cooperative workers.
Uµ(e, ς) denotes the expected utility of a worker with preferences µ ∈
{c, nc} choosing the level of effort e, for a contract ς ∈ {IC,EC}. This
utility is assumed to be linear in the payoffs. The above assumptions induce
that:
U c(e¯, EC) = w −D (1)
U c(e, EC) = (1− s)w (2)
Unc(e¯, EC) = w − d (3)
Unc(e, EC) = (1− s)w (4)
Now, let introduce the following condition:
D > sw > d (5)
It yields:
Lemma 1 Under condition (5), if an explicit contract is proposed, cooper-
ative workers always choose e and non-cooperative workers always choose
e¯.
By Lemma 1,8 the utility of each type of worker when he is matched with
a firm implementing the explicit contract is:
U ct (EC) = (1− s)w and U
nc
t (EC) = w − d (6)
8This dichotomous result (all cooperatives choose e¯ and all non-cooperatives choose
e) can be easily relaxed by assuming an additional heterogeneity. For instance, it can be
assumed that the disutility D is heterogeneous among cooperative workers. However, this
assumption would not crucially affect our results.
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The level of effort e¯ (respectively e) induces a level of output piH (respectively
piL) for the firm, with piH > piL. In addition, costs of production are assumed
to be exogenous and constant (denoted by ψ). From the Lemma 1, the
expression of the expected profit when the contract is explicit is:
ΠECt (qt) = qtpi
L + (1− qt)pi
H − ψ = piH − qt∆pi − ψ (7)
with ∆pi = piH − piL > 0. This level of profit is then a decreasing function of
the proportion of cooperative workers.
3.2 Implicit contract
3.2.1 Framework of the game
An implicit contract consists in a fixed wage w (assumed to be similar to
the wage specified by an explicit contract) and the promise of an additional
payment δ in exchange of workers effort and cooperation.9 Such an exchange
of promises is by nature non enforceable. The firm can respect the contract
(Cooperate) or not (Renege). In the same way, the worker can cooperate (e¯)
or not (e).
The choices of a firm and a worker matched together can be represented
as a simultaneous game. The payoffs matrices of this game (in the case
where the firm faces cooperative workers and non-cooperative workers) are
the following:
C R
e¯ w + δ, piH + γ − δ − ψ w − c, piH − ψ
e w + δ − c, piL − δ − ψ w, piL − ψ
cooperative worker
C R
e¯ w + δ − d, piH + γ − δ − ψ w − d, piH − ψ
e w + δ, piL − δ − ψ w, piL − ψ
non-cooperative worker
9Notice that δ may be a non-monetary reward, as the implementation of corporate
welfare programs (See Morigushi (2000) and (2003) for illustrations of corporate welfare
programs set up both in Japan and in U.S.). In the same way, the effort expected from
workers may be higher than e¯. For instance, it may consist in an investment in specific
human capital (see Morigushi (2005)). To simplify, we assume that e¯ is the same if the
contract is implicit or explicit .
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ψ, d, piH and piL are defined as in the case of explicit contract . γ denotes
the gain of cooperation for the firm10 and c the subjective cost suffered by
the cooperative worker in case of non-cooperative outcome. This cost comes
from the preferences for reciprocity of cooperative agents. These latter dislike
both to exploit or to be exploited by his partner (here, the firm). Let us note
that, due to this preference for reciprocity, he does not suffer disutility in the
case (e¯, C).
Since the contract is non enforceable, the firm has the possibility to renege
on it (to choose the strategy R), in this case δ is unpaid. In the same way the
firm cannot protect itself against shirking behavior of workers. The analysis
is restricted to the case where δ is lower than γ. The following condition
holds:
γ ≥ δ (8)
3.2.2 Resolution of the game
It is assumed that firms do not observe the type of the worker they are
matched with. They only know the proportion qt of cooperative workers. The
appropriate equilibrium concept in this case is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The following assumption allows for the selection of one equilibrium in case
of multiple equilibria.
Assumption 1 When multiple equilibria arise, it is assumed that the Pareto
optimal equilibrium is selected.
Consider the triplet of strategies (s, ec, enc) ∈ {C,R} × {e¯, e} × {e¯, e}11 and
define:
q˜ ≡
δ
γ
(9)
The following lemma provides the triplets of strategies corresponding to a
Bayesian equilibrium of the game:
Lemma 2 If qt < q˜, the unique Nash Bayesian equilibrium of the game is
(R, e, e). If qt ≥ q˜, (R, e, e) and (C, e¯, e) are the two Nash Bayesian equilibria
of the game and (C, e¯, e) Pareto dominates (R, e, e).
10The fact that the cooperation between the firm and the worker increases the joint
surplus is well documented (see Morigushi (2005) for a survey).
11Notice that the analysis is restricted to pure strategies.
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Proof See Appendix 
Non-cooperative workers always play their dominant strategy, that is
choose e¯. Under Assumption 1, the IC firms honor the contract when qt
is higher than q˜ and renege on it when qt is lower than q˜.
12 In the same way,
cooperative workers choose e¯ when the firm Cooperates and e when the firm
Reneges. Indeed, when the proportion of non-cooperative workers is high the
probability to employ a shirker is greater for the IC firm. Thus, it does
not honor the contract. Cooperative workers, who anticipate this behavior,
choose to shirk too. In this case, the cooperation is not sustainable.
These optimal behaviors yield the following expected profit when the
contract is implicit :
ΠICt (qt) =
{
piL − ψ if qt < q˜
qt(γ + pi
H) + (1− qt)pi
L − δ − ψ if qt ≥ q˜
(10)
and the following utility for each type of worker matched with a firm which
implements the implicit contract :
U ct (IC) = U
nc
t (IC) =
{
w if qt < q˜
w + δ if qt ≥ q˜
(11)
The utility of the two types of workers is the same, although the coopera-
tives choose e¯ when qt ≥ q˜ while the non-cooperatives choose e when qt ≥ q˜.
This result comes from the fact that a shirker cannot be punished if the con-
tract is implicit and that cooperative workers suffer no work disutility when
the contract is implicit .
4 The evolutionary set-up
4.1 Evolution of labor relationships
At the end of each date, firms which offer the less profitable contract have
a positive probability to be replaced by firms which offer the alternative
contract. This probability of change is assumed to be an increasing function
12The selection of equilibrium is beyond the scope of the analysis, the assumption 1
allows for a simple criterium of selection. Morever, notice that if γ is high enough, (C, e¯, e)
is both Pareto-dominant and risk-dominant. Such a restriction on the value of γ does not
crucially affect the results of the model.
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of the profit differences.13 Thus, the evolution of pt between the date t and
t+ 1 is given by the rule14:
∆pt = pt+1 − pt = pt(1− pt)ϕ(Π
IC
t (qt)− Π
EC
t (qt)) (12)
where ϕ is a positive constant, low enough to ensure that ϕ(ΠICt (qt) −
ΠECt (qt)) ∈ (0, 1). It reflects the fact that, greater is the payoff difference,
higher is the probability of switching from a contract to another. Expressions
(7) and (10) imply:
ΠICt (qt)− Π
EC
t (qt) =
{
−(1− qt)∆pi if qt < q˜
qt(γ + 2∆pi)− (∆pi + δ) if qt ≥ q˜
(13)
By Lemma 2, the cooperation is not sustainable if the contract is implicit and
qt is lower than q˜. As a consequence, the profit of a firm IC equals (pi
L − ψ)
which is lower than the profit of a firm which implements an explicit contract .
If, qt is higher than q˜, the relative profit of each type of contract depends on
the proportion qt. Let us define:
q¯ ≡
δ +∆pi
γ + 2∆pi
(14)
qt < q¯ implies qt(γ + 2∆pi) < (∆pi + δ), then explicit contract allows for
greater profits than implicit one, even if qt > q˜ (conversely if qt ≥ q¯).
Through the evolutionnary process (12), the variation of pt depends on
the value of the relative profit (ΠICt (qt)− Π
EC
t (qt)). Figure 2 represents the
value of this variation function of qt for a given pt.
If qt is low (lower than max {q¯, q˜}), explicit contracts always allow for a
higher profit than the implicit ones. The converse is true if qt > max {q¯, q˜}.
Thus, through the evolutionnary process:
{
∆pt < 0 if qt < max {q¯, q˜}
∆pt ≥ 0 if qt ≥ max {q¯, q˜}
(15)
13The fact that, at each date, each firm has a positive probability to observe the profit of
a rival and to adopt its contract if this profit is higher than its own could be a justification.
Another interpretation is that firms having the less successful form of contract have a
greater probability to disappear due to the competitive process. For further justifications
see Nelson & Winter (2002).
14See the Appendix for a formal analysis.
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qtq˜
− pt(1− pt)ϕ∆pi
1
0
q¯
pt(1− pt).
ϕ(γ+∆pi− δ)
∆pt
(a) Case where q¯ > q˜
q¯ 1 qt
∆pt
q˜
0
pt(1− pt).
ϕ(γ+∆pi− δ)
− pt(1− pt)ϕ∆pi
(b) Case where q¯ < q˜
Fig. 1. Variation of pt function of qt
Notice that, for qt ∈ (q¯, q˜), the implicit contract should be more profitable
than the explicit one if the cooperative worker and the IC firm cooperate.
However, since qt < q˜ the cooperation is not sustainable and Π
IC
t (qt) <
ΠECt (qt). This configuration can occur only if q˜ > q¯ and then if the following
condition holds:
γ < 2δ (16)
It occurs when the gains of cooperation (γ) are low compared to the cost of
cooperation (δ).
4.2 Evolution of preferences
Consider that the preference for reciprocity is transmitted from parents to
children through a mechanism of cultural transmission. In line with Bisin
& Verdier (2001), the adoption of one preference by a child is the result of
a double influence. Consider a child with parental preferences i ∈ {c, nc}.
First, he is directly exposed to the parent’s preference (and adopts this pref-
erence with a probability τ i chosen by the parent). If this direct socialization
fails (with a probability (1 − τ i)), he adopts the preference of a role model
randomly chosen in the population. Hence, with a probability qt he becomes
cooperative and with a probability (1− qt) non cooperative.
P i,jt denotes the probability for a parent with preference i to have a child
with preference j at time t. We deduce the probability for a parent of each
type to have a child with the same preferences:
14
P c,ct = τ
c
t + (1− τ
c
t )qt (17)
P nc,nct = τ
nc
t + (1− τ
nc
t ) (1− qt) (18)
The dynamics of qt is ruled by the following equation:
qt+1 = P
c,c
t qt + (1− P
nc,nc
t ) (1− qt) (19)
by substitution of (17) and (18) in (19):
∆qt = qt+1 − qt = qt(1− qt)(τ
c
t − τ
nc
t ) (20)
The probability τ i of direct (parental) transmission of preferences is en-
dogenous. A parent of type i chooses τ i ∈ [0, 1] in order to maximize:
P i,it V
i,i
t+1 + P
i,j
t V
i,j
t+1 − C(τ
i) (21)
where C(τ) = τ 2/2k is the cost of the educational effort τ . V i,jt+1 is the
utility for the parent of type i to have a child of type j. The solution of this
socialization problem is written as follow:
τ c = (1− qt)k∆V
c
t+1 and τ
nc = qtk∆V
nc
t+1 (22)
where ∆V it+1 = V
i,i
t+1 − V
i,j
t+1. Let us notice that the probability of trans-
mission of reciprocity by oblique socialization is negatively related to the
proportion of cooperative workers. The higher is this proportion, the weaker
are the incentives for cooperative parents to transmit their preferences di-
rectly and the higher are these incentives for non-cooperative parents.15
The expected utility V i,jt+1 depends on two elements. First, parents are
altruistic, then it depends on the expected utility of a child of type j. Second,
we assume that parents prefer to have a child having their own preferences.
Formally, it implies that:
V i,it+1 = U
i
t+1 + θ
i and V i,jt+1 = U
j
t+1 with θ
i > 0 (23)
U it+1 denotes the expected utility of a worker of type i for the date t +
1. Under the assumption of myopic expectations: U it+1 = U
i
t . This utility
depends on the current proportion of each type of contract in the economy
(pt). θ
i denotes the additional utility for a type i parent to have a child with
15This property is named cultural substitution by Bisin & Verdier (2001).
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the same preferences of him rather than other preferences. It is a measure of
the cultural intolerance of a parent of type i.16 It follows that:
∆V it = θ
i +∆U it (24)
With ∆U it = U
i
t − U
j
t and then ∆U
i
t = −∆U
j
t . From expression (6) and
(11), we deduce:
∆U ct = pt∆U
c
t (IC) + (1− pt)∆U
c
t (EC) = −(1− pt)(sw − d) (25)
∆Unct = pt∆U
nc
t (IC) + (1− pt)∆U
nc
t (EC) = (1− pt)(sw − d) (26)
We introduce the following assumption which ensures that∆V ct is positive
for all values of pt ∈ [0, 1]
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θc > sw − d (27)
Substitute (22), (24), (25) and (26) into (20) give a new equation of the
dynamics of qt:
∆qt = qt(1− qt)k[θ
c + (1− pt)(d− sw)− (θ
c + θnc)qt] (28)
It is straightforward that, for a given pt, this dynamics has three station-
ary states: 0, 1 and
qˆ(pt) =
θc − (sw − d) + (sw − d)pt
θc + θnc
(29)
Figure 2 describes the dynamics of qt for a given value of pt.
It shows the stability of the interior equilibrium qˆ(pt). Indeed:{
∆qt < 0 if qt > qˆ(pt)
∆qt ≥ 0 if qt ≤ qˆ(pt)
(30)
This property of stability comes from the cultural substitution between
the parental socialization and the socialization by the society. Indeed, greater
16Choosing this formulation, we depart from the Bisin & Verdier (2001) assumption of
paternalistic altruism. However, we obtain, in a simple way, the property that parents
prefer to have a child adopting the same cultural trait as their own.
17This assumption is not necessary to obtain our results, however it simplifies the pre-
sentation.
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1
qt
∆qt
0
qˆ (pt)
Fig. 2. Dynamics of qt for a given value of pt
is the proportion qt, higher is the probability that a child adopts the prefer-
ence for reciprocity in the second step of socialization (socialization by the
society). Then, greater is qt, lesser are the incentives for parents to transmit
cooperation directly.
Moreover, notice that the steady state qˆ(pt) is an increasing function of
pt. The greater is the proportion of firms which propose the implicit contract ,
the higher is the relative utility derived from cooperation (∆U ct ). Then, a
rise in pt induces an increase of the incentives to transmit the cooperative
behavior.
5 Long-run dynamics
5.1 Co-evolution between preferences and labor rela-
tionships
Figure 1 and 2 show that the dynamics of qt depends on the value of pt and
the dynamics of pt depends on the value of qt. By relations (12), (13) and
(28), the dynamical process (qt, pt)t≥0 is described by the following system of
equations:

∆pt =
{
pt(1− pt)ϕ[−(1− qt)∆pi] if qt < q˜
pt(1− pt)ϕ[qt(2∆pi + γ)− (∆pi + δ)] if qt ≥ q˜
∆qt = qt(1− qt)k[θ
c − (1− pt)(sw − d)− (θ
c + θnc)qt]
(31)
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The dynamic properties of this system are closely dependent on the relative
value of max {q¯, q˜} and qˆ(pt). Three cases have to be considered:
(i) max{q¯, q˜} ≤ qˆ(0)
(ii) max{q¯, q˜} ∈ (qˆ(0), qˆ(1))
(iii) max{q¯, q˜} ≥ qˆ(1)
Notice that, by expression (29):
qˆ(0) =
θc − (sw − d)
θc + θnc
and qˆ(1) =
θc
θc + θnc
(32)
5.1.1 Case (i) : max{q¯, q˜} ≤ qˆ(0)
(15) implies that pt increases (repectively decreases) when qt is higher (respec-
tively lower) than max{q¯, q˜}. By (30), qt increases (respectively decreases)
when qt is lower (respectively higher) than qˆ(pt). It follows the phase diagram
represented in Figure 3.
pt0
qˆ (1)
1
1
qt
max {q¯ , q˜ }
qˆ (0)
Fig. 3. Co-evolution of qt and pt when max{q¯, q˜} ≤ qˆ(0)
In this diagram one can observe that the only equilibrium globally stable is
(qˆ(1), 1), named the IC-equilibrium. At this equilibrium, all firms implement
the implicit contract and the proportion of cooperative workers is relatively
important (equal to qˆ(1)).
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The convergence towards the IC-equilibrium depends both on the prop-
erty of cultural substitution in the process of preferences transmission and
on the fact that max{q¯, q˜} is relatively low. Indeed, the cultural substitution
induces that the proportion of cooperative workers progressively brings closer
to qˆ(pt). Due to this effect and since max{q¯, q˜} ≤ qˆ(0), along the path of
convergence, the proportion qt becomes higher than max{q¯, q˜}. In this case,
pt monotonously increases until reaching 1. Hence, in the long run, (qt, pt)t≥0
converges towards (qˆ(1), 1).
5.1.2 Case (ii) : max{q¯, q˜} ∈ (qˆ(0), qˆ(1))
The phase diagram corresponding to the case (ii) is given by Figure 4.
0 pt
qˆ (1)
qˆ (0)
qt
max {q¯ , q˜ }
1
1
Fig. 4. Co-evolution of qt and pt when max{q¯, q˜} ∈ (qˆ(0), qˆ(1))
It shows that both equilibria (qˆ(0), 0), named the EC-equilibrium, and
(qˆ(1), 1) are stable and that the dynamics admits a saddle point: (max{q¯, q˜},
qˆ−1(max{q¯, q˜})). The presence of multiple equilibria induce that, the long-
run equilibrium reached by the economy depends on the initial situation. If
(q0, p0) is under the saddle path, the economy converges towards (qˆ(0), 0). If
(q0, p0) is above the saddle path, the long run equilibrium is (qˆ(1), 1).
This result comes from the complementarity between cooperative behavior
and the proportion of implicit contracts. On the one hand, when qt is low,
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the relative profit of the IC firms is low and pt decreases. On the other hand,
a decrease of pt induces a fall of the incentives to transmit the preference for
reciprocity and thus a decrease of qt.
5.1.3 Case (iii) : max{q¯, q˜} ≥ qˆ(1)
Figure 5 represents the phase diagram for this last case. It allows to con-
clude that (qˆ(0), 0) is the only globally stable equilibrium. The economy will
converge towards the EC-equilibrium, whatever the initial situation.
1
qˆ (1)
qˆ (0)
0
1
pt
qt
max {q¯ , q˜ }
Fig. 5. Co-evolution of qt and pt when max{q¯, q˜} ≥ qˆ(1)
5.2 Consequences of exogenous shocks
This section takes the situation represented by Figure 3 as a starting point.
In this configuration, the economy converges towards (qˆ(1), 1). If (q0, p0)
is close to (qˆ(0), 0), the convergence path is characterized by a progressive
increase of the proportion of cooperative workers and implicit contracts. The
following subsections deal with the consequences of two exogenous shocks on
this path.
5.2.1 Effects of a wage increase
Consider the consequences of an increase in w. For all values of pt < 1, qˆ(pt)
is a decreasing function of w and the lower is pt, the higher is this effect.
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Indeed, if an explicit contract is proposed, a rise of w allows for a higher rise
in the expected reward for a non-shirker (equal to w) than for a shirker (equal
to (1 − s)w).18 By Lemma 1, if the contract is explicit , cooperative workers
choose the high level of effort and non-cooperative workers the low level.
Then, an increase in w has a larger positive influence on the expected utility
of a non-cooperative worker than on the expected utility of a cooperative
worker (increase in ∆Unct ).
19 This induces a fall of the relative incentive to
transmit reciprocity.
In particular, a rise of w induces a fall of qˆ(0). If the increase of w is
large enough to induce qˆ(0) < max{q¯, q˜}, the dynamical properties of the
model are affected. The case (ii.), illustrated by Figure 4, holds. Then, as
a result of the shock, (qˆ(0), 0) and (qˆ1(1), 1) are two stable equilibria. The
long-run equilibrium reached by the economy depends on the distribution of
preferences at the date of the shock.
Consider the initial situation described by Figure 3, the consequences of
an increase in w depend on the date of such a shock. If it is early, when it
occurs the proportion pt and qt are relatively low. Consequently, the proba-
bibilty to be matched with a firm implementing the implicit contract is low.
The incentives to transmit reciprocity fall sharply. Then, qt decreases and, if
it becomes lower than q¯, pt decreases too. In this case, the long-run situation
will be the EC-equilibrium. The converse is true if the shock is late, at a
moment when the proportion of cooperative workers is great.
Notice that, in the case of a return towards the EC-equilibrium, the fall
of qt implies a decrease of the proportion of shirkers if the implemented
contract is explicit . This result complies with the standard contract theory:
the average level of effort rises with the wages and the supervision level.
However, the mechanism is different here. This increase does not come from
a rise of incentives to provide effort, but from the rise of incentives to transmit
the non-cooperative behavior.
5.2.2 Effects of an economic slowdown
Kandel & Pearson (2001) and Morigushi (2000, 2003, 2005) highlight that the
productivity gains, stemming from the greater commitment of the firm to its
18In this section, we consider an increase of w but the results are unaffected if a rise of
s is considered. Indeed, such a rise induces a decrease of the expected payoff of shirkers if
the contract is explicit .
19 ∂∆U
nc
t
∂w
= −pts. Thus, this effect is greater when pt or s are higher.
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employees, decrease during economic slowdowns. Hence, in our framework,
a period of recession can be modeled as a fall of γ.
Consider the situation illustrated by Figure 3 as a starting point. A
decrease of γ implies a rise both of q¯ and q˜ (see expression (9) and (14)).
Then, if this decrease is large enough, such as max{q¯, q˜} > qˆ(0), the case
(ii.) holds (illustrated by Figure 4). In this case, the consequences of the
fall of γ are qualitatively similar to the consequences of a wage increase. As
highlighted in the previous section, if pt and qt are sufficiently low at the
date of the shock, the economy will converge towards (qˆ(0), 0). However, the
driving force is different. Here, the relative profit of firms which implement
the explicit contract increases. As a consequence, the explicit contract pro-
gressively replaces the implicit contract (see expression (12)). This decrease
of pt induces a fall of the incentives to transmit cooperative behaviors and
then a decrease of qt which reinforces the initial movement.
Notice that, if the fall of γ is large enough, such as condition (16) is sat-
isfied, the proportion of IC firms decrease while it could be more profitable
then EC firms. Indeed, if following the shock qt ∈ (q˜, q¯), the cooperation
inside the IC firms is no more sustainable. Neither the firm nor the worker
honnor their commitments. Hence, the implicit contract becomes less prof-
itable and tend to be excluded.
6 Discussion
The previous section highlights the existence of multiple equilibria. As a
result, the consequences of a shock depend in a crucial way of the distribution
of preferences when it occurs. These properties provide a possible explanation
of the international differences in the type of contract. This discussion focuses
on the comparison between the Japan and the U.S.
As mentionned previously, both in Japan and U.S., the implicit contract
spreads over at the begining of the twentieth century. How explain that the
American Great Depression induced a return to the explicit contract while
a comparable shock in Japan (the post-war depression) did not affect the
generalization of the implicit contract20? According to our analysis, earlier
shock in U.S. played a central role. Indeed, this shock in favour of the
20Obviously, the nature of these two shocks was different. However, the length and the
extent of the Japanese depression should have induced similar negative consequences on
the gain of cooperation.
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explicit contract (see section 5.2.2), occured in an economy where cooperative
behaviors of both workers and firms were relatively low. Due to this lack
of cooperation, the expected profit of a firm which had implemented an
implicit contract fell and the implicit contracts rapidely disappeared. When
the shock is sufficiently large, the model predicts that implicit contract does
not longer allow for a commitment between the firm and the workforce. Such
a widespread failure to meet their promises precipitates the fall of the implicit
contracting. In the present model, the disappearance of the implicit contract
comes with the decrease of the proportion of cooperative workers, which lead
to a new increase of the relative profit of explicit contracts.21 Conversely, the
Japanese post-war depression happenned as both the proportion of implicit
contracts and cooperative workers had already raised. Consequently, when
this shock occured (even if its magnitude was similar to the American Great
Depression) the expected profits of implicit contracts were sustained by the
cooperative behavior of the workforce. Hence, the explicit form of contract
failed to suplant the implicit form of contract.
At the same time, the twentieth century is characterized by a global
increase in wages. This might make permanent the consequences of the orig-
inally temporary shocks. Indeed, as mentionned in section 5.1, the negative
effect of a wage increase on the transmission of cooperation, rises with the
proportion of explicit contracts. Following our analysis, the Great Depres-
sion, allowing the spread of such a contract, reinforces the disincentive effect
of wages on the transmission of reciprocity. Conversely, in Japan, where the
implicit contract was suficiently frequent, a wage increase had a few impact
on the transmission of cooperation. Formally, the equilibrium (qˆ(1), 1) can-
not be destabilized by an increase of w. Hence, even if the shock is temporary,
due to the rise of wages both IC and EC equilibria remain stable and the
consequences of the shock are still lasting.
7 Conclusion
Several studies point out the major role played by cultural factors in the
international differences in labor relationships. However, few works explore
the origins and evolution of such differences. The present paper aims at fill-
21Morigushi ((2000), (2003), (2005)) highlights the consequences of the Great Depression
on the fall of implicit contracting in U.S.
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ing that gap, using experimental results on social preferences and theoretical
results on the cultural transmission of these preferences. In doing this, it
provides an example of the co-evolution between institutions (types of la-
bor relationship) and culture (levels of cooperation).22 In this framework,
the level of cooperation of the workforce and the proportion of implicit con-
tracts are complements. Indeed, the more the workers are cooperative, the
more profitable is the implementation of implicit contracts. Hence, this type
of contract spread rapidly. In the same way, the decrease of the degree of
contractual completeness implies more incentives to transmit the cooperative
behaviors. This complementarity induces the possibility of multiple long run
equilibria. As a consequence, an exogenous shock may have long lasting
impact both on the distribution of preferences and the degree of contrac-
tual completeness. As an illustration, the consequences of the timing of the
Great Depression on the divergence between American and Japanese ways
to contract on the labor market is highlighted. In this analysis, the cause
of the emergence of two models (the American and the Japenese one) is not
the character intrinsically more cooperative of the Japanese workers. Indeed,
this character is a product of the economic history and is co-determined with
the nature of the labor relationship.
References
Bisin, A., & Verdier, T. 2001. The economics of cultural transmission and
the dynamics of preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 97(1), 298–319.
Bisin, A., Topa, G., & Verdier, T. 2004. Cooperation as a transmitted cul-
tural trait. Rationality and Society, 16(16), 477–507.
Bowles, S. 1998. Endogenous preferences : the cultural consequences of
markets and other economic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature,
36(1), 75–111.
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. 2000. Walrasian economics in retrospect. The
Quaterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1411–1439.
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. 1985. Culture and the evolutionary process.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
22See Bowles (1998) for a motivation of such a line of research.
24
Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., & Feldman, M. 1981. Cultural transmission and evolu-
tion: a quantative approach. NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. 2000. Fairness and retaliation: the economics of
reciprocity. The journal of economic perspectives, 14(3), 159–181.
Frey, B. 1997. On the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic work mo-
tivation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15, 427–439.
Guttman, J. 2003. Repeated interaction and the evolution of preferences for
reciprocity. The economic journal, 113, 631–656.
Morigushi, C. 2000 (October). The evolution of employement relations in
U.S. and Japanese manufacturing firms, 1900-1960: a comparative histor-
ical and institutional analysis. Tech. rept. NBER working papers.
Morigushi, C. 2003. Implicit Contracts, the Great Depression, and Institu-
tional Change : A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japanese Employment
Relations, 1920-1940. The Journal of Economic History, 63(3), 625–665.
Morigushi, C. 2005. Did American welfare capitalists breach their im-
plicit contracts during the Great Depression? Preliminary findings from
company-level data. Industrial and labor relations review, 59(1), 51–81.
Nelson, R., & Winter, S. 2002. Evolutionary Theorizing in Economics. The
journal of economic perspectives, 16(2), 23–46.
Olcina, G., & Peñarubia, C. 2004. Hold up and intergenerational transmission
of preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 54(1),
111–32.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the game described in section 3.2. P ≡ {W,F} denotes the set of
players, with W for worker and F for firm. The set of action of the player
k is denoted Sk with SF ≡ {C,R} and SW ≡ {e¯, e}. The workers can be of
two types, the set of workers types is denotes T ≡ {c, nc}. The proportion
25
qt of workers of type c is assumed to be common knowledge. µF (e|t) denotes
the belief of the firm on the probability to play the action e ∈ SW for the
worker of type t. In a similar way, µt(e
′) denotes the belief of the worker of
type t on the probability to play the action e′ ∈ SF for the firm. Strategies
sW (t) for a worker of type t and sF for the firm are defined as the following
functions:
sW (t) : T× SF → SW
sF : SW → SF
The payoff of a worker is denoted Ut(sF , sW (t)) and the the payoff of a firm
is denoted Π(sF , sW (t)).
s∗ = (s∗F , s
∗
W (c), s
∗
W (nc)) is a Nash Bayesian equilibrium if s
∗
F is the best
response to (s∗W (c), s
∗
W (nc)) and if s
∗
W (t) is the best reponse to s
∗
F for all
t ∈ T.
Let us compute the best response of the workers for given beliefs on the
action of the firm.
The nc worker as a strategy dominant, he chooses sW (nc) = e for all
beliefs on sF .
The c worker chooses sW (c) = e¯ for a given value of µc(C) if:
µc(C)Uc(C, e¯) + (1− µc(C))Uc(R, e¯) ≥ µc(C)Uc(C, e) + (1− µc(C))Uc(R, e)
µc(C)[w + δ] + (1− µc(C))[w − c] ≥ µc(C)[w + δ − c] + (1− µc(C))[w]
µc(C) ≥
1
2
(33)
Consider now the best response of the firm. It chooses sF = C for a given
value of µF (e¯|c) if:
qt[µF (e¯|c)Π(C, e¯) + (1− µF (e¯|c))Π(C, e)] + (1− qt)Π(C, e) ≥
qt[µF (e¯|c)Π(R, e¯) + (1− µF (e¯|c))Π(R, e)] + (1− qt)Π(C, e)
piL − δ − ψ + qtµF (e¯|c)[∆pi + γ] ≥ pi
L − ψ + qtµF (e¯|c)∆pi
µF (e¯|c) ≥
δ
qtγ
(34)
Since nc worker has a dominant strategy (sW (nc) = e) and since only the
pure strategies are considered, four equilibria are possible: (R, e, e), (R, e¯, e),
(C, e, e), (C, e¯, e). We will check for each of them if it is a Nash Bayesian
Equilibrium.
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(R, e, e) is based on the system of beliefs: µc(C) = 0 and µF (e¯|c) = 0.
Under these beliefs, µF (e¯|c) < δ/(qtγ) then, by (34), the optimal strategy
of the firm is sF = R. This strategy confirmed the belief of the worker
µc(C) = 0. In the same way, µc(C) < 1/2 then, by (33), the optimal strategy
of the c worker is sW (c) = e. It confirmed the belief of the firm µF (e¯|c) = 0.
Then (R, e, e) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of all values of qt.
(R, e¯, e) is based on the system of beliefs: µc(C) = 0 and µF (e¯|c) = 1.
Under these beliefs, µc(C) < 1/2 then, by (33), the optimal strategy of the c
worker is sW (c) = e. Then, the belief µF (e¯|c) = 1 is not confirmed. (R, e¯, e)
is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
(C, e, e) is based on the system of beliefs: µc(C) = 1 and µF (e¯|c) = 0.
Under these beliefs, µF (e¯|c) < δ/(qtγ) then, by (34), the optimal strategy of
the firm is sF = R. Then, the belief µc(C) = 1 is not confirmed. (C, e, e) is
not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
(C, e¯, e) is based on the system of beliefs: µc(C) = 1 and µF (e¯|c) = 1.
Under these beliefs, µc(C) > 1/2 then, by (33), the optimal strategy of the
c worker is sW (c) = e¯. Then, µF (e¯|c) = 1 is confirmed. In the same way,
µF (e¯|c) ≥ δ/(qtγ) only if qt ≥ γ/δ. In this case and only in this case the firm
choose sF = C and the belief µc(C) = 1 is confirmed. Then, (C, e¯, e) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is qt ≥ q˜.
It is straightforward that, since γ ≥ δ and piH > piL, (C, e¯, e) Pareto
dominates (R, e, e).
Formal analysis of the dynamics of pt
Assume that at the end of each date t each firm observes both the contract
and the profit of another firm randomly chosen. Consider x the firm which
observes (its profits in t are denoted Πxt ) and y the firm which is observed (its
profits in t are denoted Πyt ). If x and y have the same contract, x retained its
contract. In the same way, if x and y have different contracts and Πxt > Π
y
t ,
x retains its contract. Finally, if x and y have different contracts and if
Πyt > Π
x
t , x adopts the contract of y with a probability ϕ(Π
y
t − Π
x
t ).
Qi,jt denotes the probability for a firm which has the contract i at date
t to have the contract j at date t + 1. We deduce from this evolutionary
process the following probability of transition:
QIC,ICt = pt + (1− pt)min{1, 1− ϕ(Π
EC
t (qt)− Π
IC(qt))}
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Indeed, with a probability pt, a firm IC observes a firm of same type and
does not change its contract. With a probability (1 − pt) it observes a firm
EC and changes its contract with a probability ϕ(ΠECt (qt)−Π
IC(qt)) only if
ΠECt (qt) > Π
IC(qt). In the same way, it yields:
QEC,ICt = ptmax{0, ϕ(Π
IC
t (qt)− Π
EC(qt))}
The dynamics of pt is deduced from these probabilities of transition:
pt+1 = ptQ
IC,IC
t + (1− pt)Q
EC,IC
t
In the case where the expected profit of the EC firms is higher than the
expected profit of the IC firms (ΠECt (qt) > Π
IC(qt)), we obtain :
min{1, 1− ϕ(ΠECt (qt)− Π
IC(qt))} = 1− ϕ(Π
EC
t (qt)− Π
IC(qt))
max{0, ϕ(ΠICt (qt)− Π
EC(qt))} = 0
and
pt+1 = pt + pt(1− pt)ϕ(Π
IC
t (qt)− Π
EC(qt))
If ΠECt (qt) < Π
IC(qt):
min{1, 1− ϕ(ΠECt (qt)− Π
IC(qt))} = 1
max{0, ϕ(ΠICt (qt)− Π
EC(qt))} = ϕ(Π
IC
t (qt)− Π
EC(qt))
and it follows:
pt+1 = pt + pt(1− pt)ϕ(Π
IC
t (qt)− Π
EC(qt))
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